If we don’t have a preconceived idea, we are attracted to all of these alternatives irrespective of their merits and won’t choose one for a long time without further information. This is where the uncertainty is greatest, and a rational mind will wish to reduce the uncertainty so that a choice can be made.
But if someone has a very strong conviction on one of the alternatives, then whatever the information says, their position will hardly change for a long time — it is a pleasant state of high certainty.
Such behavior is linked to the notion of “confirmation bias” — interpreting information as confirming your views even when it actually contradicts them. This is seen in psychology as contrary to the Bayes logic, representing irrational behavior. But we show it is, in fact, a perfectly rational feature compatible with the Bayes logic — a rational mind simply wants high certainty.
The rational liar
The approach can even describe the behavior of a pathological liar. Can mathematics distinguish lying from a genuine misunderstanding? It appears that the answer is “yes,” at least with a high level of confidence.
